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1 Introduction
Economic theory suggests that the heterogeneity observed in decisions regarding retire-
ment plans, occupational choices, insurance or other aspects of everyday life can be explained
by differences in agents’ budget constraints as well as in their Risk and Time Preferences
(RTPs). In addition, in almost all theories of economic behavior, utility functions are de-
fined over goods, time periods and states of nature, placing RTPs at the crux of consumer
behavior as traditionally studied in economics. Given that cost-benefit analysis calls for wel-
fare calculations involving outcomes that are delayed or uncertain, policy recommendations
should be always analyzed through the prism of these two concepts before they are put into
action (Harrison et al., 2005).
In economic analysis, individual preferences are considered to be stable over time. Ander-
sen et al. (2008b) argue that the assumption of stable preferences lies in the ability to assign
causation between changing opportunity sets and choices in comparative statics exercises
or, in Stigler and Becker’s (1977) words, “no significant behavior has been illuminated by
assumptions of differences in tastes”. For example, academics generalize observed choices
among lotteries in the lab or in the field to build behavioral models and estimate risk param-
eters. Similarly, professionals in the financial, insurance and health sector propose long-term
products to their clients based on stated RTPs at the time of purchase. Implicitly, for these
models/parameters or products to be of any use, stability of subjects or clients RTPs over
their lifespan or period of investment is essential (Baucells and Villass, 2010). Otherwise,
if individuals’ intertemporal trade-offs change over time, preference parameters have to be
separately measured and accounted for in each time period (Meier and Sprenger, 2015). In
the same spirit, Harrison et al. (2005) note that if preferences are volatile with respect to the
passage of time, then researchers and policy-makers using out-of-sample predictions should
worry about their conclusions. Aside individual invariance, aggregate stability of RTPs is also
a very important concept in policy-making since, according to Meier and Sprenger (2015),
if the aggregate distribution of behavior is unstable, then individual preference parameters
will also exhibit such property. On the other hand, if choices over time are stable in the
aggregate, then individuals’ plans and surveys may very well serve as tools in the pursuit of
optimal policies in terms of social choice.
A number of methods have been proposed in the literature to measure RTPs. Risk prefer-
ences are usually measured in controlled laboratory experiments, using standard procedures
such as the elicitation of certainty or probability equivalents of lotteries through incentive-
compatible mechanisms (e.g., the Becker, Degroot and Marshak (BDM) mechanism, first-
and second-price auctions etc.) or the well-established methods proposed by Holt and Laury
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(2002), Lejuez et al. (2002), Gneezy and Potters (1997) and Eckel and Grossman (2002,
2008). Analogously, typical measures of time preferences stem from experiments that either
jointly elicit risk and time preferences (Andersen et al., 2008a) using the multiple price list
method (e.g., Coller and Williams, 1999), or Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2012) convex time
budget (CTB). 1
However, lab experiments do have their limitations and thus, field and laboratory experi-
ments should be treated as complementary tools in the evaluation of risk and time preferences
(Andersen et al., 2010). Due to budget constrains, conducting large scale laboratory exper-
iments to elicit preferences from representative samples is usually infeasible. Furthermore,
although the methods presented above have been found to perform fairly well in predicting
real life RTPs regarding financial decisions, there is doubt on whether they generalize to im-
portant domains of life other than financial decision-making. For example, although present
bias in an intertemporal choice task has been found to be associated with credit card debt
and creditworthiness (Meier and Sprenger, 2010, 2012), savings behavior (Ashraf et al., 2006)
and scholastic achievement (Mischel et al., 1989), Chabris et al. (2008) and Borghans and
Golsteyn (2006) argue that experimentally elicited discount rates correlate only very weakly
with health-related behavior such as exercising and smoking. With respect to risk prefer-
ences, Barseghyan et al. (2011) and Einav et al. (2012) found that many individuals do not
exhibit comparable degrees of risk aversion in different life domains, such as health, disability
or car insurance while Deck et al. (2008) has suggested that this difference might be related
to the instability of risk preferences across experimental tasks. Finally, Dreber et al. (2011)
show that the risk taking among bridge players differed substantially between the domains
of bridge and financial decision-making while MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) argue that
the risk attitudes of company managers appear to differ for risks in the recreational and
financial domain. To this end, questionnaire-based measures of eliciting RTPs in the field
and in various domains have witnessed a growing popularity in recent years (e.g., Dohmen
et al., 2011).
In this study, we examine the invariance of RTPs using primary longitudinal data on
survey-based measures over a three-year course. To our knowledge, very few studies have
evolved around the stability of RTPs using such measures in the relevant literature. In
addition, our study is one of the very few that elicits preferences more than twice over the
same subjects. Finally, the span of our data is one of the the widest (T3−T1=2 years)
while our sample size, even after two years of attrition, is at least comparable to many other
studies using primary data. Echoing the literature on stability of RTPs we find aggregate
1For elaboration on these methods see Charness et al. (2013) and Drichoutis and Nayga (2013); Andreoni
et al. (2015) for risk and time preferences, respectively.
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stability of RTPs over the three-year course of our study. In addition, we find remarkable
individual stability of most RTPs measures we employ over the same period while only a
few of our measures show instability.
In the next section we survey the literature that examines stability of RTPs to set the
context of our study. We present the details of our survey methods and sample characteristics
in Section 3. Next, we present our analysis regarding temporal stability of RTPs at the
aggregate and individual level. We conclude in the last section.
2 Literature review
Despite the importance of RTPs for economic research, the results regarding their stabil-
ity are mixed. Below, we provide a list of published articles examining the stability of time
(Table 1) and risk (Table 2) preferences; we acknowledge of course that this list might be
non-exhaustive. Note, that we have deliberately excluded studies using secondary data (e.g.,
Josef et al., 2016; Chuang and Schechter, 2015; Niv et al., 2012; McGlothlin, 1956) since the
methods of measurement, the sample sizes as well as time lapses differ vastly not only with
our study but with most studies that involve primary data collection in general. We have
also included only studies that—like ours—examine time-invariance (in the terminology of
Halevy, 2015). That is, we do not consider other types of time-stability such as consistency
or stationarity (e.g., Horowitz, 1992; Gine´ et al., 2016; Li et al., 2013 or some treatments
of Halevy, 2015).2,3 Finally, we exclude studies whose subjects were selected using criteria
related to various medical disorders (e.g., Littlefield et al., 2015; Aklin et al., 2009; Bickel
et al., 2011; Takahashi et al., 2007).4
2.1 Studies on time preferences
Interestingly, as shown in Table 1, most articles regarding the stability of time preferences
come from fields outside economics, such as psychology, decision science and neuroscience.
All studies that are discussed below involved some kind of choice between sooner-smaller
amounts and later-lower rewards; specific money and delay ranges are reported in Table 1.
2In the terminology of Horowitz (1992), intertemporal stationarity is similar to Halevy’s (2015) time-
invariance but different than stationarity as defined in Horowitz (1992).
3In Li et al. (2013), although the design would allow for tests of time-invariance, correlations across
waves are not reported. However, it is stated that in the case of temporal discounting and loss aversion,
common variance and substantial stability over 1 year is observed.
4Of course, some could argue that nicotine dependence falls within this category and thus Baker et al.’s
(2003) and Johnson et al.’s (2007) studies should also be excluded from the review. However, since nicotine
dependence is quite common and might be also present in many other studies that do not control for it, we
do not expect to have affected their results.
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In particular, Olson et al. (1999) report individual differences in children’s willingness to
wait for a delayed reward that are relatively stable across 2-years’ time. Simpson and Vu-
chinich (2000) assessed discount rates for hypothetical monetary gains for 15 participants
in two sessions separated by 1 week and found a high correlation between sessions. Baker
et al. (2003) also examined the 1-week stability of discount rates for 30 current smokers and
30 never-before smokers with also high test-retest correlations while Johnson et al. (2007)
replicated this study in a group of 30 light smokers with similar results. Ohmura et al. (2006)
compared indifference points and discounting parameters (e.g., hyperbolic k and area under
the curve) elicited by the same 22 students in two different occasions within an interval of
three months and found that time preferences were invariant across time. In Kable and
Glimcher (2007), as part of a screening for an fMRI session, 12 subjects were asked to make
incentivized choices in three different sessions conducted within 3 days to 6 months. Results
indicate that ten out of the twelve subjects revealed stable discount rates.
Peters and Bu¨chel (2009) compared discount rates derived from a behavioral pretest
shortly (median time distance 4 days) before an fMRI session with discount rates observed
during fMRI scanning and found a high correlation. To examine long-term stability, they also
repeated the experiment after approximately 4 months, using 13 subjects from the initial pool
and discount rates showed stability between testing sessions. Ballard and Knutson (2009)
faced their 16 subjects with incentivized choice tasks; first in front of a computer and then in
a fMRI scanner with choices revealing within-subjects reliability. In a very interesting study,
Anokhin et al. (2011) offered subjects the same real choice at two different points in time,
with a 2-year time lapse. Subjects were 606 12-year-olds from 303 pairs of mono-zygotic
and di-zygotic twins who were re-tested at the age of 14. The choice was given individually
to each twin who was unaware of their co-twin’s choice. They report a highly significant
within-subject association between choices made at ages 12 and 14 but a significant decrease
in the prevalence of impulsive choices with age. Finally, in one of the few relevant studies
with more than 2 periods, Kirby (2009) collected choices with monetary incentives between
sooner immediate and later rewards from student-subjects. The procedure was repeated
after 5 weeks and 52 weeks thereafter. The common sample between periods 1-2, 2-3 and
1-3 was 81, 37 and 46, respectively. Their results indicate high temporal aggregate stability
and suggest that the discount rate for monetary rewards is a stable individual trait.
In the economics literature, Kirby et al. (2002), used a pool of 154 Tsimane’ Amerindians
(10-80 years of age) and a series of incentive compatible choices over 4 quarters. Their results
indicate that, starting from the second quarter and for both monetary and candy choices,
the correlations between the discount rates derived from consecutive periods are reliable
(albeit low). Furthermore, excluding the first period, all rates were associated with a single
5
underlying factor.5 Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013) report both aggregate stability as well as high
test-retest correlations between the incentivized choices made by 53 student-subjects within
an interval of 5 to 10 weeks. Dean and Sautmann (2014) and Meier and Sprenger (2015)
found that aggregate choice profiles and corresponding estimates of discount parameters are
unchanged over a period of one week and one year, respectively. They also report significant
within-subjects rate correlations in their samples of 960 individuals in the former and 250
subjects in the latter study. Finally, Halevy (2015) used a sample of 130 student subjects
to study various properties of time preferences including time-invariance. Unlike previous
findings, his results suggest that average choices are inconsistent with the time invariance
assumption since subjects are, on average, more impatient for a one week delay when asked
at a later date. In addition, depending on the treatment, the amount of sooner payment
and whether choices are interpreted as revealing strict or weak preference, the percentage of
subjects that made time-invariant choices ranged from 44% to 68%.
5Although Kirby et al. (2002) provide pair-wise correlation coefficients for rates across all periods, they
do not discuss their statistical significance, nor perform aggregate comparisons.
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2.2 Studies on risk preferences
The picture of risk preferences studies is quite different than time preferences. As seen
in Table 2, the majority of studies regarding the inter-temporal stability of risk preferences
comes from the economics literature while many studies have been conducted over the last
few years indicating a rising interest. In the non-economics literature, Ohmura et al. (2006)
elicited Certainty Equivalents (CE) of hypothetical uncertain amounts in 18 students and
found that CE (except those elicited under 10% probability) were correlated within-subjects
while, at the aggregate level, most of the mean indifference points in probability discounting
had absolute stability over a 3-month period. Levin et al. (2007) conducted a 3-year follow-up
to 62 child-parent pairs from Levin and Hart’s (2003) study, repeating the real choice tasks
between risky and safe options from the original study. Their results are supportive of both
aggregate and individual stability in children and parents. White et al. (2008) assessed the
performance of 39 volunteers aged 18 to 35 years old in the incentivized Balloon Analogue
Risk Task (BART, Lejuez et al., 2002) and concluded that the mean risk behavior (adjusted
average pumps) as well as individuals’ risk behavior between sessions did not change. Finally,
Glo¨ckner and Pachur (2012) repeated all Holt and Laury (2002) tasks and several gain, loss
and mixed lottery choice tasks in two sessions, a week apart. They found that in most of the
cases, people made the same choice at the two sessions while the correlations of the prospect
theory parameters showed a large effect size.
Within the economics literature, Wehrung et al. (1984) using hypothetical investment
scenarios, investigated the stability of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) co-
efficient over a 1-year period for 90 business executives and reported a small but highly
significant positive correlation for the personal risk measures, but no stability for business
risk propensity. Love and Robison (1984) examined risk preferences of 23 U.S. farmers using
hypothetical choices between pairs of distributions of possible after-tax income levels. Their
results imply that risk preferences were most stable at the income level representing the
majority of the individuals but not for other income levels. Schoemaker and Hershey (1992)
elicited CE for gains and losses from 160 MBA students and the same CE questions were
administered 3 weeks later. Although some subjects were explicitly given monetary incen-
tives to be consistent with their earlier answers ($10 for those in the highest decile in terms
of consistency), test-retest correlations were low in both domains. Smidts (1997) examined
long-run (1-year) risk attitudes concerning the market price for potatoes in 205 Dutch farm-
ers. Using the midpoint chaining technique, he observes a strong correlation for the CRRA
coefficient. Hey (2001) elicited preferences over 100 choices between pairwise risky lotteries
made from 53 students and repeated over 5 periods that were separated by a few days from
each other. During the 5 periods, a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 91 consecutive changes
9
in stated preferences were observed. Also, over all 5 waves, the number of differing answers
within-subjects ranged from 3 to 48, indicating that on at least half the questions, subjects
had fixed stated preferences. Harrison et al. (2005) tested the stability of CRRA coefficients
at two points in time using the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure over 5-6 months and found
no significant differences. The same procedure was followed by Andersen et al. (2008b), but
this time the lapses varied from 3 to 17 months. The CRRA coefficients were significantly
correlated across time, although some variation was observed. In Goldstein et al. (2008),
roughly 150 participants generated desired return distributions in hypothetical retirement
savings scenarios in 2 sessions over a 1 year period (common sample was 85 subjects). Their
results indicated that the transformed CRRA model-based risk parameters derived from the
two different sessions were significantly correlated, especially when corrected for attenuation
and investment experience.
Baucells and Villass (2010) on the other hand, concluded that albeit the statistical pattern
among sessions was stable, there was a lot of instability in individual preferences across points
in time. They used only two hypothetical lottery choice questions (one in the gain domain
and 3 months later one in the loss domain) in 141 MBA student-subjects. Straznicka (2012)
examined the 1-week stability of five different risk preference measures which all but one were
of hypothetical nature. She observed an important stability of risk measures between sessions
while at the individual level, the degree of risk aversion had significantly increased with the
exception of survey-based measures that were found to be more stable. Zeisberger et al.
(2012) elicited CE for gain, loss and mixed lotteries with real incentives from 73 students
and observed considerable instability of risk aversion and probability weighting over a period
of one month.
Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013), using a series of choices between a sure amount and a lottery
in 53 student-subjects which were repeated within 5 to 10 weeks, concluded that risk aversion
and probability weighting parameter estimates revealed consistency both at the individual
and the aggregate level. Finally, in Lo¨nnqvist et al. (2015), 44 student-subjects were called
to make the same decisions in the incentivised Holt and Laury (2002) task within a time
interval of 13 to 15 months. The results suggest no robust test-retest stability for the
lottery-choice measure. However, Lo¨nnqvist et al.’s (2015) design was very distinct because
it also allowed the measurement of risk preferences from a risk taking questionnaire from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Unlike the Holt and Laury (2002) measure, these
risk-related questions were found to have a very good test-retest stability.
10
T
ab
le
2:
L
it
er
at
u
re
on
te
m
p
or
al
st
ab
il
it
y
of
ri
sk
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
T
y
p
e
o
f
sa
m
p
le
N
a
t
T
1
N
a
t
T
2
C
o
m
m
o
n
N
T
im
e
la
p
se
M
et
h
o
d
s
In
ce
n
ti
v
es
W
eh
ru
n
g
et
a
l.
(1
9
8
4
)
S
en
io
r
ex
ec
u
ti
v
es
5
0
0
9
0
9
0
1
y
ea
r
G
a
in
eq
u
iv
a
le
n
ce
s
fo
r
in
v
es
tm
en
t
d
ec
is
io
n
s
in
-
v
o
lv
in
g
p
er
so
n
a
l
a
n
d
co
rp
o
ra
te
re
so
u
rc
es
H
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
L
o
v
e
a
n
d
R
o
b
is
o
n
(1
9
8
4
)
fa
rm
er
s
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
y
ea
rs
C
h
o
ic
es
b
et
w
ee
n
p
a
ir
s
o
f
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
o
f
p
o
s-
si
b
le
a
ft
er
-t
a
x
in
co
m
e
le
v
el
s.
H
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
S
ch
o
em
a
k
er
a
n
d
H
er
-
sh
ey
(1
9
9
2
)
M
B
A
S
tu
d
en
ts
1
6
0
1
6
0
1
6
0
3
w
ee
k
s
C
er
ta
in
ty
eq
u
iv
a
le
n
ts
fo
r
g
a
in
a
n
d
lo
ss
lo
tt
er
ie
s
M
o
n
et
a
ry
:
$
1
0
fo
r
co
n
si
st
en
cy
(t
o
p
1
0
%
o
f
ea
ch
g
ro
u
p
)
S
m
id
ts
(1
9
9
7
)
F
a
rm
er
s
2
5
3
2
3
8
2
0
5
≈1
y
ea
r
C
er
ta
in
ty
eq
u
iv
a
le
n
ts
fo
r
5
0
-5
0
lo
tt
er
ie
s
w
h
er
e
th
e
m
o
n
et
a
ry
a
m
o
u
n
ts
a
re
p
ri
ce
s
fo
r
p
o
ta
to
es
H
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
H
ey
(2
0
0
1
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
5
3
5
3
5
3
(a
ls
o
in
T
3
,T
4
,T
5
)
≥
2
d
a
y
s
1
0
0
ch
o
ic
es
b
et
w
ee
n
p
a
ir
w
is
e
ri
sk
y
lo
tt
er
ie
s
w
it
h
v
a
ri
o
u
s
a
m
o
u
n
ts
(-
$
2
5
,
$
2
5
,
$
7
5
a
n
d
$
1
2
5
)
M
o
n
et
a
ry
:
1
o
u
t
o
f
5
0
0
ch
o
ic
e
ta
sk
s
is
p
a
id
o
u
t
H
a
rr
is
o
n
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
5
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
1
7
8
3
1
3
1
5
-6
m
o
n
th
s
H
o
lt
a
n
d
L
a
u
ry
(2
0
0
2
)
ta
sk
M
o
n
et
a
ry
O
h
m
u
ra
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
6
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
1
8
1
8
1
8
3
m
o
n
th
s
C
h
o
ic
es
b
et
w
ee
n
a
la
rg
er
ri
sk
y
o
p
ti
o
n
o
f
1
0
0
,0
0
0
y
en
(r
ec
ei
v
ed
w
it
h
so
m
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
)
a
n
d
a
sm
a
ll
er
b
u
t
sa
fe
o
p
ti
o
n
.
T
h
e
m
a
g
n
i-
tu
d
e
o
f
th
e
sa
fe
o
p
ti
o
n
ra
n
g
ed
b
et
w
ee
n
1
0
0
a
n
d
1
0
0
,0
0
0
y
en
.
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
v
a
lu
es
o
f
ri
sk
y
o
p
ti
o
n
ra
n
g
ed
fr
o
m
.9
5
to
.0
5
H
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
L
ev
in
a
n
d
H
a
rt
(2
0
0
3
);
L
ev
in
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
7
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
7
2
6
2
6
2
3
y
ea
rs
C
h
o
ic
es
b
et
w
ee
n
a
su
re
-t
h
in
g
o
p
ti
o
n
a
n
d
a
5
0
-
5
0
o
r
2
0
-8
0
ri
sk
y
ch
o
ic
e
b
o
th
in
th
e
g
a
in
a
n
d
th
e
lo
ss
d
o
m
a
in
s
R
ea
l:
P
a
rt
ic
i-
p
a
n
ts
a
ct
u
a
ll
y
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
th
e
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s
o
f
th
ei
r
ch
o
ic
es
,
ei
th
er
w
in
n
in
g
o
r
lo
si
n
g
d
im
es
A
n
d
er
se
n
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
8
b
)
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
v
e
sa
m
p
le
o
f
th
e
a
d
u
lt
D
a
n
is
h
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
2
5
3
9
7
9
7
3
-1
7
m
o
n
th
s
M
P
L
b
a
se
d
o
n
H
o
lt
a
n
d
L
a
u
ry
(2
0
0
2
)
ta
sk
a
n
d
it
er
a
te
d
M
P
L
M
o
n
et
a
ry
in
ce
n
-
ti
v
es
:
1
0
%
ch
a
n
ce
o
f
a
ra
n
d
o
m
ly
ch
o
se
n
ta
sk
to
b
e
b
in
d
in
g
G
o
ld
st
ei
n
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
8
)
W
o
rk
in
g
A
d
u
lt
s
1
5
2
1
5
8
7
5
1
y
ea
r
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
u
se
th
e
S
h
a
rp
e
et
a
l.
’s
(2
0
0
0
)
d
is
-
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
b
u
il
d
er
to
g
en
er
a
te
d
es
ir
ed
re
tu
rn
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
in
a
fi
ct
it
io
u
s
re
ti
re
m
en
t
sa
v
in
g
s
sc
en
a
ri
o
H
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
o
n
n
ex
t
pa
ge
..
.
11
T
ab
le
2:
L
it
er
at
u
re
on
te
m
p
or
al
st
ab
il
it
y
of
ri
sk
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
(C
on
t.
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
sa
m
p
le
N
a
t
T
1
N
a
t
T
2
C
o
m
m
o
n
N
T
im
e
la
p
se
M
et
h
o
d
s
In
ce
n
ti
v
es
W
h
it
e
et
a
l.
(2
0
0
8
)
V
o
lu
n
te
er
s
3
9
3
9
3
9
2
w
ee
k
s
B
a
ll
o
o
n
A
n
a
lo
g
u
e
R
is
k
T
a
sk
(B
A
R
T
)
M
o
n
et
a
ry
:
R
ea
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
b
a
se
d
o
n
o
u
tc
o
m
es
o
f
B
A
R
T
B
a
u
ce
ll
s
a
n
d
V
il
la
ss
(2
0
1
0
)
M
B
A
st
u
d
en
ts
2
1
0
1
4
1
1
4
1
3
m
o
n
th
s
T
w
o
lo
tt
er
y
ch
o
ic
e
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s,
o
n
e
fo
r
g
a
in
s
a
n
d
o
n
e
fo
r
lo
ss
es
H
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
G
lo¨
ck
n
er
a
n
d
P
a
ch
u
r
(2
0
1
2
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
6
6
6
4
6
4
1
w
ee
k
H
o
lt
a
n
d
L
a
u
ry
(2
0
0
2
)
ta
sk
,
se
v
er
a
l
o
th
er
g
a
in
,
lo
ss
a
n
d
m
ix
ed
lo
tt
er
y
ch
o
ic
e
ta
sk
s.
O
n
ly
3
8
ch
o
ic
e
ta
sk
s
a
re
th
e
sa
m
e
a
cr
o
ss
T
im
e
1
a
n
d
T
im
e
2
.
M
o
n
et
a
ry
in
ce
n
-
ti
v
es
:
1
o
u
t
o
f
1
3
8
ch
o
ic
e
ta
sk
s
is
p
a
id
o
u
t
a
t
a
1
0
0
:1
ex
ch
a
n
g
e
ra
te
S
tr
a
zn
ic
k
a
(2
0
1
2
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
1
8
3
1
8
3
1
8
3
1
w
ee
k
E
v
a
lu
a
te
ri
sk
in
es
s
o
f
a
g
a
m
b
le
o
n
a
0
to
1
0
sc
a
le
,
ch
o
o
se
h
o
w
m
u
ch
o
u
t
o
f
1
0
0
to
in
v
es
t
b
et
w
ee
n
a
lo
tt
er
y
a
n
d
a
ri
sk
fr
ee
a
ss
et
,
ce
r-
ta
in
ty
eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t
o
f
a
lo
tt
er
y,
ra
te
w
il
ln
g
n
es
s
to
ta
k
e
ri
sk
s
in
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
d
ec
is
io
n
s
o
n
a
0
to
5
sc
a
le
,
H
o
lt
a
n
d
L
a
u
ry
(2
0
0
2
)
ta
sk
M
o
n
et
a
ry
:
o
n
e
ch
o
ic
e
fr
o
m
th
e
H
o
lt
a
n
d
L
a
u
ry
(2
0
0
2
)
ta
sk
is
ra
n
d
o
m
ly
ch
o
se
n
;
a
ll
o
th
er
ta
sk
s
a
re
h
y
p
o
th
et
ic
a
l
Z
ei
sb
er
g
er
et
a
l.
(2
0
1
2
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
8
6
8
6
7
3
1
m
o
n
th
C
er
ta
in
ty
eq
u
iv
a
le
n
ts
fo
r
g
a
in
,
lo
ss
a
n
d
m
ix
ed
lo
tt
er
ie
s
M
o
n
et
a
ry
:
O
n
e
su
b
je
ct
ev
er
y
1
0
su
b
je
ct
s
is
p
a
id
o
u
t
fo
r
a
lo
tt
er
y
o
u
tc
o
m
e
W
o¨
lb
er
t
a
n
d
R
ie
d
l
(2
0
1
3
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
1
4
4
5
3
5
3
5
-1
0
w
ee
k
s
C
h
o
ic
es
b
et
w
ee
n
a
su
re
a
m
o
u
n
t
a
n
d
a
lo
tt
er
y
M
o
n
et
a
ry
:
O
n
e
d
ec
is
io
n
is
ra
n
-
d
o
m
ly
ch
o
se
n
a
s
b
in
d
in
g
L
o¨
n
n
q
v
is
t
et
a
l.
(2
0
1
5
)
S
tu
d
en
ts
2
3
2
4
4
4
4
1
3
-1
5
m
o
n
th
s
H
o
lt
a
n
d
L
a
u
ry
(2
0
0
2
)
ta
sk
,
D
o
h
m
en
et
a
l.
(2
0
1
1
)
su
rv
ey
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s
(e
v
a
lu
a
te
d
o
n
a
0
to
1
0
sc
a
le
)
M
o
n
et
a
ry
:
o
n
e
ch
o
ic
e
o
f
th
e
H
o
lt
a
n
d
L
a
u
ry
(2
0
0
2
)
ta
sk
w
a
s
p
a
id
o
u
t;
th
e
D
o
h
m
en
et
a
l.
(2
0
1
1
)
is
n
o
n
-i
n
ce
ti
v
iz
ed
N
ot
es
:
‘N
at
T
1’
an
d
‘N
at
T
2’
st
an
d
fo
r
sa
m
p
le
si
ze
a
t
T
im
e
1
a
n
d
2
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
‘C
o
m
m
o
n
N
’
is
th
e
sa
m
p
le
si
ze
le
ft
a
ft
er
a
tt
ri
ti
o
n
at
T
2
or
d
u
e
to
ot
h
er
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
sp
ec
ifi
ed
b
y
th
e
st
u
d
y.
If
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s
w
er
e
el
ic
it
ed
a
t
a
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
p
o
in
ts
,
th
es
e
a
re
in
d
ic
a
te
d
a
s
T
3,
T
4
et
c.
12
3 Methods
3.1 The Survey
To study the stability of RTPs, we chose to use a number of survey-based measures
that pertain to patience, impulsiveness and risk (both financial and in other domains). All
measures have been employed in previous studies and have been shown to correlate with the
usual RTPs measures. Table 3 presents the specific questions and cites the sources of these
measures which we briefly describe below.
Patience as a measure of the rate of time preferences has been validated as a survey
measure in Vischer et al. (2013). In the same study, the authors draw the distinction of
impatience with another measure, that of impulsiveness or impulsivity (the terms are used
interchangeably in the literature). Impulsiveness is a psychological construct that is also
thought to be closely related to intertemporal choice since the inability to delay gratifica-
tion is considered the core problem of impulsive behaviors. Vischer et al. (2013) highlight
that the distinction between impatience and impulsiveness is important, especially in situa-
tions where impulsive behavior may lead to decisions that are not in accordance with one’s
time preferences. For years, both self-reported measures have been included in a large and
representative data set, the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP).
In addition, GSOEP includes two risk preferences measures. The first resembles the ones
discussed above, in that it is a general measure of risk-taking propensity derived from a one-
item survey question asking respondents to state their risk perception of themselves on a 0-10
scale. As simple as it may appear, this risk measure has been shown to be significantly related
to actual risky behavior regarding investment in stocks, being self-employed, participating
in sports, and smoking, even after controlling for a large number of observables (Dohmen
et al., 2011). The answers to the second measure, called ‘the Risk investment question’ (also
known as ‘the e100,000 question’) have been found to be strong predictors for decisions in
the financial domain (Dohmen et al., 2011). On top of that, Leuermann and Roth (2012)
reported a significant relationship between this lottery question and an incentivized Holt and
Laury (2002) risk preferences elicitation task.
For a non-unidimensional measure of risk, we opted for the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
(DOSPERT) scale (Weber et al., 2002). DOSPERT is a 40-item scale that assesses risk
taking in five domains: financial decisions (F), health/safety (H/S), recreational (R), ethical,
and social decisions. A shorter 30-item scale (Blais and Weber, 2006) has appeared in the
literature as well as an ultra short 4-item scale (Coppola, 2014) with good predictive validity.
In this study, we took a middle point by adopting a limited (15-item) DOSPERT scale. To
construct this limited scale, we started with the 30-item scale (Blais and Weber, 2006) and
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eliminated the ethical and social subscales which were out of the scope of our research agenda.
This left us with 18-items. We used 12 of these items in verbatim form (items 1-5, 8-9, 11-15
shown in Table 3) while we eliminated three questions: a) the unprotected sex question
as inappropriate to address to parents (we discuss the characteristics of our sample in the
next section), given the context of the rest of the questions which concerned the dietary
habits of children b) two questions about investing in a diversified fund and business venture
which we thought it would be difficult to explain given the ‘take home and return’ nature
of our questionnaire. We replaced the ‘Drinking heavily at a social function’ (H/S domain)
and ‘Going whitewater rafting at high water in the spring’ (R domain) with two questions
from the limited DOSPERT scale of Szrek et al. (2012) (items 6 and 10 for the R and H/S
domains, respectively; shown in Table 3). The remaining item ‘Betting a day’s income on
the outcome of a sporting event’ was modified as ‘Betting 10% of your monthly income on
the outcome of a sporting event’ since it is more common for people to think about income
in monthly terms.
Finally, we have also included the well-known Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) that has
been shown to correlate well with a variety of risk and time preferences measures (Frederick,
2005).
3.2 Sample
A questionnaire consisting of all the above measures was delivered to schoolchildren
aged 6-8 year old through two different schools in the city of [undisclosed] and during three
measurement periods; baseline (T1:May-June 2013), after one year (T2:May-June 2014) and
a year thereafter (T3:May-June 2015). The pupils were asked to deliver the questionnaire to
their caretakers who, during two group-meetings with one of the researchers, had received an
earlier notice and briefing about the purpose of the main study which was unrelated to this
paper (discussed momentarily) as well as about the longitudinal nature of their responses.
Because data collection was conducted through schools and in order to avoid confounding
by social desirability or other such issues, we focused on ensuring the confidentiality of the
responses. In particular, each school provided the unique register number (RN) of each
student (but not their names); we gave back open envelopes that were labelled with the
RN of the student to be handled and enclosed the questionnaires. When completed, the
questionnaires were placed inside the same envelope by the respondents and the envelope
was sealed and returned to the school; then sent by mail to the researchers. The same
procedure was repeated over all waves. Thus, schools did not have access to the responses,
since they were receiving and mailing closed envelopes, while we did not have access to the
14
Table 3: Measures of risk and time preferences
Measure Question Measurement Reference
Patience Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who al-
ways shows great patience?
0-10 scale Vischer
et al.
(2013)
ImpulsivenessAre you generally an impulsive person, or someone who always
shows great caution?
0-10 scale Vischer
et al.
(2013)
Risk Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?
0-10 scale Dohmen
et al.
(2011)
Risk in-
vestment
How much of a e100,000 prize would you invest in a lottery
with a 50-50 chance of doubling it or losing half?
6 point scale
ranging from
e100,000 to
nothing with
steps of e20,000
Dohmen
et al.
(2011);
Leuer-
mann
and Roth
(2012)
Cognitive
Reflection
Test
A bat and a ball cost e1.10 in total. The bat costs e1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
Open ended Frederick
(2005)
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
Open ended
In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake?
Open ended
DOSPERT 1. Going camping in the wilderness. (R) 1-7 scale Blais and
Weber
(2006);
Szrek et al.
(2012)
2. Betting a days income on lotto or scratch cards. (F)
3. Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative
stock. (F)
4. Betting a days income at a high-stake poker game. (F)
5. Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability. (R)
6. Cool off in a fast-flowing river with shoulder-deep water on
a hot summer day. (R)
7. Betting 10% of your monthly income on the outcome of a
sporting event (F)
8. Driving a car without wearing a seat belt. (H/S)
9. Taking a skydiving class. (R)
10. Sit in the front seat of a car without a seat belt. (H/S)
11. Riding a motorcycle without a helmet. (H/S)
12. Sunbathing without sunscreen. (H/S)
13. Bungee jumping off a tall bridge. (R)
14. Piloting a small plane. (R)
15. Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of town.
(H/S)
15
identities of the subjects. Aside the group-meetings, this procedure was also described in
detail in the informed consent that children were asked to return signed by their parents,
prior to the administration of the baseline questionnaires.
Table 4: Number of subjects per year and panel sample
Year: 2013 2014 2015
Returned questionnaires 159 157 130
Responded to at least one risk/time measure 122 130 106
Three year
panel sample
Patience 80 80 80
Impulsiveness 80 80 80
Risk 80 80 80
Risk (investment) 78 78 78
CRT 61 61 61
DOSPERT 62 62 62
Two year panel
sample
(2013-2014)
Patience 25 25 -
Impulsiveness 26 26 -
Risk 26 26 -
Risk (investment) 26 26 -
CRT 21 21 -
DOSPERT 23 23 -
Two year panel
sample
(2014-2015)
Patience - 15 15
Impulsiveness - 15 15
Risk - 15 15
Risk (investment) - 14 14
CRT - 11 11
DOSPERT - 12 12
Two year panel
sample with gap
(2013 and 2015)
Patience 6 - 6
Impulsiveness 6 - 6
Risk 6 - 6
Risk (investment) 7 - 7
CRT 5 - 5
DOSPERT 6 - 6
The purpose for choosing the specific sample is that our questionnaire was an appendix
to that of an unrelated main questionnaire which collected various data regarding the socio-
economic characteristics of the parents and the dietary, sedentary and sleeping behavior of
the child as well as other family-environmental variables. This questionnaire allowed the
identification of the respondent (in terms of his/her relation to the child) and thus we were
able to perform individual matches in the measures of RTPs across waves. The selection of
schools was made to serve the critical requirements of the main survey which was to assure
the recruitment of families with both higher and lower socio-economic status but without
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worrying too much about the differences in ethnicity/culture. Although the main survey
took place in seven European countries, the appendix questionnaire with RTPs measures
was only administered to one of these [country removed for peer review]. For details on the
design and methodology of the survey see Mantziki et al. (2014).
Respondents were asked to return the questionnaires in two-weeks’ time. Response rates
were high, reaching 88.3% in the first year, 87% in the second year and 72.2% in the third
year. However, as Table 4 shows, about 80% of the returned questionnaires contained some
information regarding the purpose of this study, lowering the actual response rates to 59%-
72%. In terms of follow-up rates, the number of matched responses in all three waves ranges
from sixty-one to eighty subjects, depending on the specific measure. Finally, depending on
the specific measure, five to twenty-six respondents were only tracked in two out of the three
points in time. We do not analyze data points related with the two-year panel at T1 and
T3 (bottom panel of Table 4) due to very small number of observations.
In terms of demographics, respondents are mostly female, older than the age of 36 years
old and of medium to high education level (Table 5). They mainly live in households with 2
to 4 adults and 1 or 2 children. As per income status, half of the respondents self-reported
to be in the lower classes while the other half in the higher ones. This profile was of course to
be expected, considering the target audience that were primary caretakers of 6- to 8-year old
children in both high and low socio-economic-status families. Overall, although our sample
is far from representative of the general population, it is comparable to most other studies
presented above while the time span of our study is one of the longest in the literature.
4 Results
Results are presented in the following sections. First, aggregate response profiles over
the three years of the study are presented for each of the risk and time preferences measures.
Second, we restrict our attention to the three year panel sample in order to examine their
temporal stability at the individual level. We also examine temporal stability of responses
from the two year panel sample, that is, for subjects that participated in years 2013-2014 or
2014-2015.
4.1 Temporal stability in aggregate
In this section we examine stability of preferences by looking at the aggregate distribution
of responses for each risk/time preferences measure. We examine responses for all subjects
that responded to at least one of the risk/time measures (sample size for each year is given
17
Table 5: Summary statistics (%) for 2013, 2014 and 2015 samples
Year: 2013 2014 2015 Test statistic
Gender
Female 90.91 89.15 90.48 χ2 = 0.24
Male 9.09 10.85 9.52 p = 0.89
N 121 129 105
Age
≤ 35 15.83 14.73 13.33
36-40 40.83 41.86 31.43 χ2 = 3.29
≥ 41 43.33 43.41 55.24 p = 0.19
N 120 129 105
Education
6-8 years 4.10 5.38 1.98
9-11 years 6.56 2.31 6.93 χ2 = 1.12
12-14 years 36.07 33.85 28.71 p = 0.57
15-17 years 39.34 43.85 49.50
≥ 18 years 13.93 14.62 12.87
N 122 130 101
N of adults in
household
1 3.31 6.20 4.72
2 66.94 62.79 74.53 χ2 = 3.20
3-4 23.14 25.58 18.87 p = 0.20
≥ 5 6.61 5.43 1.89
N 121 129 106
N of minors in
household
1 18.85 17.83 23.58
2 63.11 63.57 66.98 χ2 = 4.23
3 10.66 12.40 6.60 p = 0.12
≥ 4 7.38 6.20 2.83
N 122 129 106
Present income
Living comfortable 11.57 13.18 22.55
Coping 38.84 39.53 37.25 χ2 = 4.92
Difficult 29.75 32.56 28.43 p = 0.09
Very difficult 19.83 14.73 11.76
N 121 129 102
Notes: The ‘test statistic’ column displays Pearson’s chi-squared test (and cor-
responding p-value) for Gender and Kruskal-Wallis tests (and corresponding p-
values) for all the other variables. Sample is constrained to subjects that have
non-missing values for at least one of the risk/time measures.
in second row of Table 4); we do not restrict analysis to the panel sample. This is justified
by the fact that sample pools are similar across the three years of the study as shown in
Table 5.
Figure 1 plots distributions of responses by year, separately for each risk/time measure.
Distributions of responses are depicted in the form of histograms with percent of responses
on the vertical axis. The only exception is the DOSPERT measure which, given the wide
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range of scores, it is depicted with a kernel density plot.6 Eyeballing Figure 1 reveals a
consistent pattern of responses across years with just a few exceptions here and there. What
matters for aggregate stability, however, is not a few differences in the scale of a measure
but the overall distribution of responses.
Table 6 shows mean, standard deviation and median for each risk/time preferences mea-
sure and their subscales. Summary statistics provide some, albeit incomplete, information
about the underlying distribution of the data. For example, looking at the median, we see
that there are just small shifts in the location of the distributions from one year to the
other. Statistical tests can inform us whether two samples are drawn from the same popu-
lation. Typically, Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests (Kolmogorov (1933), reprinted in English
by Shiryayev (1992); Smirnov (1948)) and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum (WMW) tests
(Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann and Whitney, 1947) are employed to test whether the underlying
distributions of the two samples are equal. The WMW test detects only locational shifts
while the KS detects differences in distributions due to location, scale, or family. A drawback
of the KS test for our case, is the assumption that the data are drawn from a continuous
distribution, while most of our risk/time measures are discrete and ordinal in nature. An
alternative to the KS test is the Epps-Singleton test, where both continuous and discrete
data may be used and has been shown to be more powerful than the KS test (Epps and
Singleton, 1986).7
The last two columns of Table 6 show results for: a) the Epps-Singleton test for the Pa-
tience, Impulsiveness, Risk and Risk/investment measures b) the KS test for the DOSPERT
measure and its subscales c) the WMW test for the CRT and d) proportion tests for the
CRT individual questions (CRT1, CRT2 and CRT3). As shown, most of the tests fail to
reject the null that the underlying distributions of the two samples are equal. There is one
minor exception for the CRT2 and CRT3 questions when looking at the change between 2014
and 2013. However, the statistical significant results fail to show up in the aggregate CRT
measure.8
All in all, the analysis in this section echoes the results from the literature about aggregate
stability of risk and time preferences. This should not downplay the importance of our results
since they concern preference stability over a wide time frame of three consecutive years, one
of the largest in the literature. Although aggregate preference stability is important, Meier
and Sprenger (2015) note that a stable distribution of responses could be obtained without
6Figure A.1 in Apendix A shows additional graphs for the DOSPERT subscales and the individual
questions of the CRT.
7See Goerg and Kaiser (2009) for a Stata implementation.
8In Figure A.1e and A.1f it appears that less subjects give a wrong answer to these two particular CRT
questions in 2014 as compared to 2013 which is what the statistical test might be picking up.
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(a) Percentage distribution of patience scale (b) Percentage distribution of impulsiveness scale
(c) Percentage distribution of willingness to take
risks scale
(d) Percentage distribution of lottery investment
question
(e) Kernel density of Domain-Specific Risk-
Taking scale
(f) Percentage distribution of number of correct
answers in the Cognitive Reflection Test
Figure 1: Distribution of responses across years for the risk/time measures
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individual stability. Next section tackles the issue of individual level stability of preferences
by analyzing only the panel samples.
4.2 Temporal stability in individual behavior
Given the voluntary nature of responding to the questionnaire and the three time points
at which the questionnaires were filled, we ended up with two types of panels. In the
first panel, we have individuals that respondent to all three waves of the survey. Table 4
shows that the number of subjects which have complete responses in all three waves for
each risk/time measure varies from 61 subjects (for CRT) to 80 subjects (for Patience,
Impulsiveness and Risk). These numbers are reduced even further if one tries to combine
responses to the risk/time measures with demographics, since a few more subjects have
incomplete information regarding one or more demographic variables.
One way to analyze data from the three year panel is to calculate the difference between
values in two consecutive years.9 A person with stable responses in the two years should have
a score of differences equal to zero. Subjects with instability would deviate from zero, so that
larger differences would indicate greater instability. Figure 2 shows scatter graphs of changes
in year 2014 with respect to 2013 (horizontal axis) and changes in year 2015 with respect to
2014 (vertical axis). Points that fall exactly on the dashed cross lines intersection, that is,
on coordinates [0,0], indicate subjects with response stability for the full three year period.
To get a sense of proportions, marks are depicted as bubbles with bubble sizes proportional
to the frequency of occurrence of each case.10 Bubbles that fall on either the vertical or the
horizontal dashed cross lines, show subjects that gave the same response in at least two time
points.11 By looking at the graphs in Figure 2 one can see that there is some heterogeneity
in terms of stability of responses. However, there are enough subjects that fall on either
one of the cross dashed lines, which indicates stability of preferences for at least two time
9Since most of our RTPs measures are ordinal in nature, taking their difference does not ensure the
ordinality of the resulting measure nor it is permissible to make interpretations in continuous terms. Thus,
we do not use this technique for conducting statistical tests or econometric analysis but rather as a trick to
graph stability of responses.
10To illustrate this, consider Figure 2a which depicts the Patience scale. This figure shows that 18 subjects
fall exactly on the cross intersection which is to say that 18 subjects gave the exact same response on the
Patience scale in the three years of the survey.
11Consider Figure 2a again. The figure shows 15 (=7+5+2+1) subjects on the horizontal cross line and
12 (=2+1+2+3+2+1+1) subjects on the vertical cross line. These subjects gave the exact same response on
the patience scale in at least two time points. These are different subjects than the 18 subjects that fall on
the cross intersection. Table A.1 in Appendix A depicts the number and percent of subjects that fall on the
intersection of the dashed cross lines, on either one of the cross lines and the cumulative percent. As shown
in Table A.1, if we use the cumulative percent as the desired metric, highest individual stability is achieved
by the Risk/investment measure, followed by the DOSPERT measure, while the least stable measure is the
CRT.
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points. The percent of subjects that fall on either one of the dashed cross lines is quantified
in Table A.1 in Appendix A and can be as high as 80.8% of subjects for the Risk/investment
measure or as low as 27.4% for the CRT. This indicates large variability between risk/time
measures in terms of their temporal stability for the three year panel sample.
The analysis above is, of course, deterministic in that it allows no error in the decision
making process. To account for the panel data structure, we explore individual stabil-
ity by means of random effects regressions. Given the nature of the risk/time measures
we estimate random effects ordered logit models for the Patience, Impulsiveness, Risk and
Risk/investment measures and random effects linear regression models for DOSPERT and
CRT. To test for individual stability we are mainly interested on the coefficient estimates
of the year dummies. Results are shown in Table 7 while Table A.2 in Appendix A shows
results for the DOSPERT subscales and CRT individual questions. The upper panel shows
results without any demographic control variables included in the model specification while
the lower panel includes as controls the set of demographic variables shown in Table 5. Ta-
ble 7 omits estimated parameters for ancillary parameters and coefficients for demographic
controls in order to focus attention to the year dummies (the year 2014 serves as the base
category).
Table 7 shows that for the Patience and Risk/investment measures, none of the year
dummies is statistically significant in both panels of the table (with and without demographic
controls), indicating high temporal stability of these measures. We reach a similar conclusion
for the DOSPERT measure looking at the upper panel of the table. Even though the 2015
year dummy reaches statistical significance levels once we control for demographics, this is
only significant at the 10% level. For the CRT measure, the upper panel shows a highly
statistically significant result for 2013 with respect to the 2014 year dummy. However, when
we control for demographics we fail to reject the null for both year dummies. Thus, we can
plausibly group the DOSPERT and CRT measures to the list of measures that exhibit high
temporal stability in the three year panel. On the other hand, both the Impulsiveness and
Risk measures exhibit statistically significant coefficients for the year dummies in Table 7,
which is consistent with temporal instability.
The second type of panel concerns subjects that responded to two consecutive waves but
not in the third one. These are subjects with responses at time points 2013-2014 and 2014-
2015. The number of subjects that responded to each of the risk/time measures is shown
in the third and fourth panels of Table 4. We pool together responses from both two year
panels in order to maximize available sample size.
Table 8 shows the percent of subjects that exhibited stability in their responses in the
two consecutive years of the survey. As shown, the Risk/investment measure exhibits very
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(a) Changes in Patience scale (b) Changes in Impulsiveness scale
(c) Changes in Risk scale (d) Changes in Risk/investment question
(e) Changes in the Domain-Specific Risk-
Taking scale
(f) Changes in number of correct answers in
the Cognitive Reflection Test
Figure 2: Scatter graph of changes for the risk/time measures for the three year period
weighted by frequency
Notes: In each graph, the horizontal axis shows differences in scores for 2014 vs. 2013. The vertical axis shows differences for
2015 vs. 2014. Marks that fall on the cross in each graph indicate subjects that showed stability of the respective measure
(i.e., the score difference is exactly zero) for at least a one year time lapse. Marks that fall exactly on the cross intersection
show subjects that are consistent in their responses for all three years. Bubble size is proportional to the frequency of each.
A small number near the bubble indicates the frequency of each case. Bubbles with no numbers are single cases. Given the
wide range of the DOSPERT scale, data are grouped in intervals of range of five (the first category being the [-2,2]) to allow
small deviations from one year to the other to be classified as consistent. That is, any particular bubble for the DOSPERT
scale counts observations within a range and not on a specific data point.
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Table 7: Random effects ordered logit and linear regression for the three year panel sample
Patience Impulsiveness Risk Risk investment DOSPERT CRT
w
/o
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 36.758
∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗
(1.762) (0.147)
2013 -0.122 -0.969∗∗∗ 0.290 0.377 -0.855 -0.246∗∗
(0.303) (0.295) (0.294) (0.351) (1.517) (0.121)
2015 -0.159 -0.653∗∗ -0.661∗∗ -0.016 -1.516 -0.115
(0.303) (0.298) (0.298) (0.344) (1.517) (0.121)
N 240 240 240 234 186 183
Log-L -413.781 -455.837 -443.535 -248.060 -716.783 -244.903
w
/
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s
Constant 38.845∗∗∗ 0.932∗
(6.267) (0.479)
2013 -0.448 -1.239∗∗∗ 0.149 0.488 -0.437 -0.167
(0.331) (0.327) (0.316) (0.384) (1.598) (0.115)
2015 -0.359 -0.544∗ -0.672∗∗ 0.219 -2.833∗ -0.190
(0.340) (0.328) (0.331) (0.387) (1.639) (0.120)
(0.332) (0.322) (0.321) (0.383) (1.607) (0.124)
N 213 213 213 207 171 165
Log-L -358.393 -395.968 -388.388 -213.913 -652.372 -199.502
Notes: Random effects ordered logit models are estimated for Patience, Impulsiveness, Risk and
Risk investment. Random effects linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT and CRT.
Ancillary parameter estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models
including demographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls
are omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
high stability for 57.5% of subjects. The least stable measures are the overall DOSPERT
measure, followed closely by Patience and Impulsiveness.
In Table 9 we show results from random effects ordered logit and random effects linear
regressions where the respective risk/time preferences measure of interest is regressed on a
year dummy taking the value of 1 for the second year of the two year panel.12 The upper
panel shows results without any demographic control variables while the lower panel includes
as controls the set of demographic variables shown in Table 5. Table 9 omits estimated
parameters for ancillary parameters and coefficients for demographic controls.
In the upper panel of Table 9 only the year dummy for the CRT measure is statistically
significant. When demographics are controlled for in the lower panel of the table, statistical
significance for CRT is taken away. This is a good indication of temporal stability across all
risk/time preferences measures for the two year panel sample.
Given that we analyzed separately the three year and two year panels, one might worry for
robust statistical inference with respect to reduced sample sizes. In Table A.4 and Table A.5
in the Appendix A we show additional results for the main risk/time measures and their
12Table A.3 in Appendix A shows results for the DOSPERT subscales and CRT individual questions.
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Table 8: Percent of subjects showing stabil-
ity/instability for the two year panel sample
Stability Instability
Patience 30.00 70.00
Impulsiveness 31.71 68.29
Risk 41.46 58.54
Risk (investment) 57.50 42.50
DOSPERT 28.57 71.43
DOSPERT-f 55.26 44.74
DOSPERT-h/s 35.00 65.00
DOSPERT-r 36.84 63.16
CRT 53.13 46.88
CRT1 83.78 16.22
CRT2 67.57 32.43
CRT3 73.53 26.47
Notes: For the DOSPERT measure, data
are grouped in intervals of range of five to
allow small deviations from one year to the
other to be classified as consistent. Given
the narrower range of the DOSPERT sub-
scales, data are grouped in intervals of range
of three for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s
and DOSPERT-r.
subscales, respectively, where we pool together the three year panel and the two year panel.
Results echo what was discussed above in that we can safely assume highly temporal stability
with the exception of the Impulsiveness and Risk measures.
5 Conclusions
Despite the noise and the absence of real incentives for truthful answers, using survey-
based measures of RTPs is of paramount importance for researchers. In this paper, we
investigated the empirical power of a questionnaire consisting of such measures in an effort
to learn more about the stability of these concepts that are crucial in economic research. To
do so, we analysed patterns of aggregate differences as well as of individual-level changes in
six measures of RTPs.
In line with existing literature, we observe important temporal stability of RTPs mea-
sures at the aggregate level. This is extremely useful in policy-making where the allocation
of resources should be based on the interest of the groups and not of the individuals. Even if
agents move between groups throughout the implementation of a designed policy, the alloca-
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Table 9: Random effects ordered logit and linear regression for the two year panel samples
Patience Impulsiveness Risk Risk investment DOSPERT CRT
w
/o
d
em
o-
gr
ap
h
ic
s
Constant 35.000∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗
(2.427) (0.214)
2nd year -0.129 0.090 -0.095 0.072 1.086 0.375∗∗
(0.407) (0.413) (0.424) (0.480) (3.180) (0.181)
N 80 82 82 80 70 64
Log-L -165.467 -170.803 -166.752 -87.924 -285.486 -94.504
w
/
d
em
o-
gr
ap
h
ic
s
Constant 34.553∗∗∗ -0.916
(12.002) (0.786)
2nd year -0.295 -0.259 -0.454 -0.107 1.307 0.285
(0.463) (0.481) (0.500) (0.552) (3.384) (0.218)
N 78 80 80 80 68 64
Log-L -151.149 -158.201 -147.230 -80.907 -272.176 -78.579
Notes: Random effects ordered logit models are estimated for Patience, Impulsiveness, Risk and Risk
investment. Random effects linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT and CRT. Ancillary
parameter estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including
demographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
tion may still be optimal if group interests remain stable. At the individual level, our results
reveal that there is heterogeneity in terms of stability with some of the measures achieving
a high degree of intertemporal stability while others failing to do so. Using appropriate
econometric methods to control for demographics and random effects, we conclude that four
out of six RTPs measures exhibit intertemporal stability within-subjects.
Aside the importance of our findings, we acknowledge a number of limitations related to
our study. First of all, the profile of our respondents is very specific and cannot be considered
as representative of the general population. However, there is little evidence suggesting that
the results could be completely driven by differences in the pool of respondents; a fact that is
also the cornerstone of the validity of lab experiments, that usually involve student-subjects
(Belot et al., 2010).
Second, as with all survey-based measures, our approach does not provide respondents
with incentives to reveal their preferences. In addition, since we do not have data on actual
behavior with respect to risky or intertemporal choices, we cannot establish links between
RTPs, as measured by the employed survey instruments, with real choices in the field;
for this, we have to rely on previous studies. Finally, as Harrison et al. (2005) note, the
stability over longer periods of time requires that one take into account possible changes
in the ‘states of nature’. While we do record possible changes in states of nature we do
not know for sure whether we have recorded every possible change. Thus, whether our
results point towards the (in)stability of the behavioral concepts we seek to examine or
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toward measurement error, is a question that we cannot answer with high confidence. The
inclusion of questions like the ones we have employed in our study, in large longitudinal
surveys that allow their observation over time in conjunction with other behavioral patterns
and characteristics of respondents, is definitely a step towards the right direction; data
stemming from such sources are valuable for the study of preference stability. Judging from
the recent flourishing literature on intertemporal stability of such data, we feel that this
is a direction currently well-understood by economists, psychologists and other social and
behavioral scientists.
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A Appendix: Additional tables/figures
(a) % distribution of willingness
to take risks scale
(b) % distribution of lottery in-
vestment question
(c) % distribution of lottery in-
vestment question
(d) % distribution of answers in
the bat/ball CRT
(e) % distribution of answers in
the machines/widgets CRT
(f) % distribution of answers in
the lake/lily pad CRT
Figure A.1: Distribution of responses across years for the CRT and DOSPERT subscales
Table A.1: Percentage and number of subjects with temporal stability for
the three-year panel sample
No change in response in . . .
2013-2014-2015 2013-2014 2014-2015 Cumulative
N % N % N % %
Patience 18 22.50 12 15.00 15 18.75 56.25
Impulsiveness 11 13.75 11 13.75 12 15.00 42.50
Risk 14 17.50 13 16.25 12 15.00 48.75
Risk (investment) 33 42.31 16 20.51 14 17.95 80.77
DOSPERT 25 40.98 9 14.75 11 18.03 73.77
CRT 3 4.84 6 9.68 8 12.90 27.42
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Table A.2: Random effects logit and linear regressions for the three year panel sample
DOSPERT-f DOSPERT-h/s DOSPERT-r CRT1 CRT2 CRT3
w
/o
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 9.205
∗∗∗ 12.819∗∗∗ 13.730∗∗∗ -2.286∗∗∗ 0.019 1.393∗∗
(0.512) (0.813) (0.883) (0.645) (0.616) (0.706)
2013 -0.356 0.361 0.284 -0.307 -1.039∗ -1.351∗∗
(0.559) (0.671) (0.831) (0.556) (0.571) (0.628)
2015 -0.575 0.014 -0.405 0.000 -0.439 -0.515
(0.559) (0.671) (0.831) (0.546) (0.546) (0.593)
N 219 216 222 216 210 186
Log-L -617.772 -676.441 -732.511 -101.293 -112.181 -98.512
w
/
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s
Constant 10.496∗∗∗ 13.508∗∗∗ 18.396∗∗∗ -1.118 -0.242 -1.706
(2.540) (3.634) (3.857) (2.940) (3.994) (4.115)
2013 -0.101 0.479 0.910 -0.167 -0.801 -1.332
(0.587) (0.715) (0.918) (0.656) (0.700) (0.854)
2015 -0.860 0.085 -1.044 -0.171 -0.702 -1.174
(0.590) (0.736) (0.933) (0.655) (0.697) (0.891)
N 198 195 201 195 192 156
Log-likelihood -546.811 -602.139 -649.120 -79.067 -90.355 -70.108
Notes: Random effects linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s and
DOSPERT-r. Random effects logit models are estimated for CRT1, CRT2, CRT3. Ancillary parameter
estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including demographic con-
trols shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
Table A.3: Random effects logit and linear regressions for the two year panel samples
DOSPERT-f DOSPERT-h/s DOSPERT-r CRT1 CRT2 CRT3
w
/o
d
em
o-
gr
ap
h
ic
s
Constant 9.500∗∗∗ 13.750∗∗∗ 11.947∗∗∗ -1.609 -0.259 -0.891
(0.779) (1.070) (1.194) (1.151) (0.529) (0.922)
2nd year -0.184 0.800 0.184 -0.000 0.693 2.087∗
(0.898) (1.068) (1.319) (0.821) (0.612) (1.068)
N 76 80 76 74 74 68
Log-L -224.846 -260.658 -256.437 -40.730 -48.260 -40.105
w
/
d
em
o-
gr
ap
h
ic
s
Constant 11.895∗∗ 3.704 6.807 -3.465 -3.531 -9.936
(5.232) (7.437) (8.900) (4.111) (3.735) (6.102)
2nd year -0.521 1.264 0.217 -0.394 0.402 2.128∗
(0.953) (1.205) (1.453) (0.832) (0.676) (1.133)
N 74 78 74 74 74 58
Log-L -207.912 -245.835 -244.859 -32.581 -30.515 -18.890
Notes: Random effects linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s
and DOSPERT-r. Random effects logit models are estimated for CRT1, CRT2, CRT3. Ancillary
parameter estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including
demographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.4: Random effects ordered logit and linear regression pooling together the three
year and two year panel samples
Patience Impulsiveness Risk Risk investment DOSPERT CRT
w
/o
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 36.784
∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗
(1.415) (0.121)
2013 -0.167 -0.665∗∗∗ 0.190 0.253 -1.437 -0.268∗∗
(0.253) (0.249) (0.252) (0.296) (1.455) (0.106)
2015 -0.256 -0.359 -0.612∗∗ -0.165 -1.725 -0.052
(0.264) (0.262) (0.261) (0.304) (1.529) (0.111)
N 320 322 322 314 256 247
Log-L -590.471 -635.041 -627.976 -341.463 -1009.078 -340.848
w
/
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s
Constant 39.289∗∗∗ 0.785∗
(5.736) (0.435)
2013 -0.395 -0.819∗∗∗ 0.166 0.362 -1.272 -0.193∗
(0.271) (0.267) (0.265) (0.317) (1.522) (0.104)
2015 -0.562∗ -0.220 -0.519∗ -0.106 -2.544 -0.143
(0.295) (0.288) (0.288) (0.336) (1.676) (0.113)
N 291 293 293 287 239 229
Log-L -525.558 -572.641 -562.543 -306.023 -936.852 -292.934
Notes: Random effects ordered logit models are estimated for Patience, Impulsiveness, Risk and
Risk investment. Random effects linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT and CRT.
Ancillary parameter estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models
including demographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls
are omitted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
37
Table A.5: Random effects logit and linear regressions pooling together the three year and
two year panel samples
DOSPERT-f DOSPERT-h/s DOSPERT-r CRT1 CRT2 CRT3
w
/o
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s Constant 9.252
∗∗∗ 13.607∗∗∗ 13.286∗∗∗ -2.149∗∗∗ 0.313 0.936∗
(0.427) (0.649) (0.714) (0.556) (0.447) (0.518)
2013 -0.249 -0.363 0.010 -0.161 -1.262∗∗∗ -1.236∗∗
(0.494) (0.589) (0.725) (0.478) (0.465) (0.509)
2015 -0.407 -0.479 -0.426 0.191 -0.497 -0.013
(0.509) (0.618) (0.759) (0.487) (0.466) (0.504)
N 295 296 298 290 284 254
Log-L -843.866 -938.888 -990.656 -143.401 -160.194 -140.846
w
/
d
em
og
ra
p
h
ic
s
Constant 10.360∗∗∗ 13.068∗∗∗ 16.513∗∗∗ -2.083 0.347 -2.970
(2.343) (3.263) (3.602) (1.994) (2.019) (2.089)
2013 -0.169 -0.500 0.419 -0.013 -1.038∗∗ -1.071∗
(0.514) (0.626) (0.776) (0.515) (0.507) (0.552)
2015 -0.555 -0.340 -0.720 -0.143 -0.738 -0.267
(0.546) (0.685) (0.842) (0.545) (0.549) (0.585)
N 272 273 275 269 266 214
Log-L -770.360 -860.349 -905.216 -116.900 -141.221 -108.519
Notes: Random effects linear regression models are estimated for DOSPERT-f, DOSPERT-h/s
and DOSPERT-r. Random effects logit models are estimated for CRT1, CRT2, CRT3. Ancillary
parameter estimates are omitted. The lower panel of the table shows results from models including
demographic controls shown in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for demographic controls are omitted.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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